American defense strategy depends on airpower. That has been true for decades, but the demand signal is sharper now. The United States expects its Air Force to deter China, reassure allies in Europe, defend the homeland, respond to crises in the Middle East and remain ready for major war. Those missions are spread across different theaters, different timelines and different levels of risk. They all assume that enough combat airpower will be available when needed.
That assumption is becoming harder to defend.
The Air Force fighter fleet is now the oldest and smallest in the service’s 78-year history. Legacy fighter aircraft have been divested at roughly a two-to-one ratio compared with the procurement of new fighters. The fighter inventory is projected to reach its lowest point in fiscal year 2028, and the service’s primary mission fighter aircraft inventory has already fallen below the congressionally mandated floor of 1,145 aircraft.
These figures point to a basic force-planning problem. The United States is assigning its fighter force a global mission set while allowing the force to shrink during recapitalization. Better aircraft are necessary, but they do not eliminate the need for enough aircraft. A smaller fighter force has fewer tails for training, fewer aircraft available during maintenance cycles, fewer options for combatant commanders and less ability to absorb attrition if deterrence fails.
The Air Force’s fiscal 2027 budget request would buy 62 fighters: 38 F-35As and 24 F-15EXs. That would be an improvement over deeper cuts, but it remains below the level needed to stabilize the force. National Guard leaders have urged Congress to support at least 72 new fighters per year, with a goal above 100 as the industrial base allows. The difference between 62 and 72 aircraft may look modest in one budget cycle. Over several years, it determines whether the force continues to shrink or begins to recover.
This is the context for the bipartisan letter I led to congressional defense leaders with Representatives Don Bacon, Donald Davis, Russell Fry, Clay Higgins, Dusty Johnson, Nancy Mace, Ralph Norman, August Pfluger, Pete Stauber, Chris Smith, William Timmons and Joe Wilson. The letter urges Congress to use the FY27 defense bills to procure no fewer than 72 fighters per year, scale above 100 as industry allows, support multiyear procurement authority for the F-35A and F-15EX, maintain at least 57 combat-coded fighter squadrons and require better reporting on fighter recapitalization across the Active, Guard and Reserve components.
The proposal is deliberately specific. It does not try to settle every dispute about the future of air power. It addresses the nearer-term problem that aircraft are leaving the inventory faster than replacements are arriving.
AI is expanding the mission data footprint across defense environments, increasing the need for scalable, layered data-at-rest (DAR) protection.
Some divestment is necessary. Older aircraft become more expensive to sustain and less useful against advanced threats. But divestment only works when replacement capacity arrives on time. Retiring aircraft before replacements are fielded does not only change the age of the force. It changes the size of the force.
That timing problem is central to the fighter debate. A fighter that arrives in the 2030s cannot offset a squadron shortfall in the late 2020s. Future systems matter, but they do not meet today’s requirements until they are fielded, crewed, maintained, integrated and available to commanders.
The debate should not become a competition between platforms. The F-35A remains central to fifth-generation capacity. The F-15EX provides payload, range, homeland defense value and a practical replacement path for aging aircraft. The F-22 remains important until the next air dominance platform is fielded in sufficient numbers. The F-47 and collaborative combat aircraft will shape the next generation of airpower. These programs should be treated as parts of one force-design problem: whether the fighter fleet is large enough, modern enough and ready enough to support US strategy.
That question is most urgent in the Pacific. The Department of Defense has assessed that China surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads by mid-2024 and could have more than 1,000 by 2030. China is also modernizing its conventional forces, missile forces, maritime forces, space capabilities, cyber capabilities and air forces. The relevance for fighter procurement is not that every Chinese capability requires a US fighter response. It is that the pacing challenge is large, sustained and increasingly sophisticated. A shrinking fighter fleet leaves less room to meet that challenge while also covering other global commitments.
Following my letter to congressional leadership, I am proud that the House-passed FY27 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes a key priority to strengthen America’s fighter fleet for the long term. By establishing higher fighter inventory requirements and expanding multiyear procurement authority, Congress is taking meaningful action to ensure our Air Force has the aircraft needed to deter our adversaries and maintain air superiority. We must also continue working to ensure the Air National Guard is fully included in all recapitalization efforts, including those involving legacy fighters.
While these provisions represent an important step forward, our work is not finished. Congress should use the remaining FY27 defense bills to fully align fighter procurement with our national defense strategy. Combatant commanders need enough aircraft to meet real-world requirements. If the United States wants a defense strategy that deters aggression, reassures allies and gives commanders options in crisis, Congress and the Department of Defense must close the fighter gap before a conflict exposes it.
Rep. Sheri Biggs represents South Carolina’s Third District and serves on the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Homeland Security. A lieutenant colonel in the Air National Guard and Air War College graduate, she served as a medical crew director on combat missions during Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. With over 30 years in health care, including as a doctor of nursing practice, she is a board-certified psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner.
The use of the author’s military rank and title is for identification purposes only and does not imply or constitute endorsement by the Department of Defense or the Air National Guard. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US government.
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